Power, contracts, and the evidence

The finding: infrastructure is power

Palantir does not need to own everyone's data to become consequential. Its business is to connect information, model relationships and put the resulting analysis into operational workflows. When governments buy that capability, they also make decisions about who can be investigated, located, targeted or prioritized for services. The public-interest question is not whether the software is mysterious. It is whether the power it enables is lawful, demonstrably effective, contestable and reversible.

The company's own 2025 annual report describes software integrating data, decisions and operations; reports $4.5 billion in annual revenue, 54% from its government segment; and describes expanding installations horizontally and vertically inside customers. Those are 2025 figures, not a claim about full-year 2026 revenue. S1

Three findings survive scrutiny. The Army explicitly says its $10 billion agreement is a purchasing ceiling, not committed spending. ICE's expansion into ImmigrationOS and ELITE is documented in procurement-based reporting, not speculation about secret software. Britain's statistics regulator says important NHS benefit metrics cannot establish cause and effect, while parliamentary testimony exposes unresolved questions about supplier dependence.

The central criticism is institutional: agencies can gain capacity faster than the public gains visibility into data sources, error rates, procurement decisions and remedies. That is an analytical conclusion from the evidence below, not a finding that every deployment is unlawful or harmful.

Evidence and claim ledger

Established means supported by the cited record. It does not mean independently reproduced software testing. Reported means attributed to journalism. Disputed means the company contests the allegation or the available evidence does not settle it.

• Established historyS1S2S3S4

  Intelligence roots and In-Q-Tel backing

  Early investment is not proof of present CIA control.

• Company filingsS1S2

  Founders have entrenched voting influence

  The 49.999999% mechanism is conditional. It is not automatic ownership of half the company.

• IncorrectS5

  Army committed $10 billion

  Maximum potential purchases over up to ten years. Not obligations or cash paid.

• Official award noticeS6S7

  Maven received a $795 million modification

  Order-level funding. Do not call the entire face value spent.

• Procurement-based reportingS8

  ImmigrationOS supports removal workflows

  Requirements and a prototype deadline do not prove every feature was delivered.

• Document and testimony-based reportingS10

  ELITE maps potential targets and scores addresses

  An address confidence score is not a criminality score or a conviction.

• IncorrectS13

  German court prohibited Palantir globally

  The ruling concerned particular statutory powers, not a worldwide product ban.

• Not established here; expressly deniedS15

  Palantir built Lavender or Gospel

  Do not publish as fact or infer it from the Israel partnership.

• Not established by cited before/after metricsS22

  NHS performance gains were caused by FDP

  Lack of causal proof is not proof the platform has no benefit.

• Unsupported inferenceS30

  Epstein financed Palantir through Valar

  Valar fund commitments are separate from Palantir financing.

1. Intelligence origins and founder control

Palantir says it was founded in 2003 and began building software for US intelligence counterterrorism investigations and operations. Its governance documents identify Alex Karp, Stephen Cohen and Peter Thiel as the three founders party to its special voting arrangements. Karp is the CEO, Cohen the president and Thiel the chairman in the 2025 proxy. That legal definition of Founders is not a claim that only three people participated in the company's creation. S1 S2

In-Q-Tel backing is documented history, not a speculative connection. A 2025 book excerpt by Michael Steinberger describes a $1.25 million equity investment and recurring collaboration between Palantir engineers and CIA analysts beginning in 2005. That amount is the author's reported historical figure, not an investment agreement independently inspected for this file. In 2020, lawmakers asked the SEC for clearer disclosure of In-Q-Tel's holdings, as reported by TechCrunch. Neither account establishes its current stake or operational control. S3 S4

The more immediately verifiable concentration of power is corporate governance. The 2025 proxy explains that Class A shares have one vote, Class B ten, and Class F variable votes. Subject to an ownership threshold and other terms, the founder arrangements can bring the relevant founders' aggregate voting power to 49.999999%. The 2025 annual report again warns that the structure concentrates voting power with Cohen, Karp, Thiel and affiliates. This is not a criminal allegation. It is the company's disclosed governance design. S1 S2

Why it matters: public investors' economic participation does not translate into proportionate influence over controversial customer relationships. Corporate independence standards, a public listing and technical safeguards are different forms of accountability. None substitutes for democratic control of government use.

2. Follow the contracts, not inflated totals

The Army's July 2025 announcement is unusually explicit: the cap does not represent specific obligations or commitments. Consolidating purchases can reduce fees and obtain discounts. It can also deepen dependence on one supplier. Both propositions can be true. S5

The two Maven notices identify the same underlying contract. They establish a $480 million original award and a $795 million modification, not two unrelated programs. Both say funding will be determined with each order. This file does not present the sum as total obligations as of November 2026, and does not add Maven figures to the Army enterprise cap as though the instruments were necessarily non-overlapping. S6 S7

WIRED's February 19, 2026 report describes a department-wide DHS buying arrangement covering licenses, maintenance and implementation. That is evidence of a route for expansion across DHS, not evidence that every component agency has deployed it. S11

Accounting discipline: a ceiling is permission to buy up to a limit; an obligation is a legal commitment of funds; an outlay is payment; recognized revenue follows accounting rules. A modification can raise value without immediate payment. A defensible spending total requires transaction-level reconciliation by contract and order, including deobligations and overlapping vehicles. That reconciliation has not been done here.

3. ICE: from case files to enforcement maps

ICE's own August 9, 2021 privacy assessment describes Investigative Case Management as the core case-management tool primarily used by Homeland Security Investigations. It organizes case files and links records across investigations. The assessment also describes internal audit access. It lists retention of investigative case records for 20 years and biometric records for 75 years. These are the policy terms in that assessment, not a fresh audit of present deletion practices. S9

An HSI case-management system is not identical to every ICE arrest or removal system. Palantir's historical relationship cannot by itself prove its role in any particular enforcement action. The public record becomes stronger when procurement requirements or operational documentation connect a product to a use. S9

On April 18, 2025, WIRED described a $30 million contract update and a five-page ICE justification. The stated functions were enforcement prioritization, near-real-time visibility into self-deportation, and streamlining the immigration lifecycle and removal logistics. The reported prototype deadline was September 25, 2025. The article says the justification did not specify the data sources needed for the new tracking capability. It also quotes ICE's rationale that Palantir's institutional knowledge and existing infrastructure made it the only vendor able to meet the urgent timeframe. S8

An agency's dependence on an incumbent can become the justification for buying still more from that incumbent. An urgency rationale is evidence of the agency's procurement position. It is not proof of a rigged award. A prototype requirement is not acceptance testing, and the deadline alone does not establish operational delivery.

On January 15, 2026, 404 Media reported on ELITE, Enhanced Leads Identification & Targeting for Enforcement, using internal ICE material, procurement records and sworn testimony. The accessible article describes maps of potential deportation targets, individual dossiers, address confidence scores and address information from HHS among other sources. This is materially more specific than saying Palantir merely sells generic office software. S10

What remains unproved: the complete data-source inventory, legal authority for every transfer, current matching error rates, how agents interpret confidence scores, and which particular arrests resulted from particular outputs. An address score does not establish unlawful status or dangerousness. This file does not attribute a shooting, family separation or wrongful removal to ELITE without a documented event-level chain.

Public-interest analysis: data originally supplied to obtain benefits can create a deterrent to seeking those benefits if it is repurposed for enforcement. Testing that concern requires purpose-specific legal authorities, data-sharing agreements and evidence about actual use — not just assurances that access is password-protected.

4. Policing and the right to challenge an inference

The Verge's February 2018 investigation, based on records and interviews, reported that New Orleans had used Palantir since 2012 in a partnership structured as philanthropic assistance. It described social-network analysis of police records, field interviews and other information to identify people considered at risk of committing or experiencing violence. Key council members told the outlet they had not known about the relationship. The story also reported that the available evaluation did not confirm claims that the program caused the city's temporary violence reduction. S12

This is a historical accountability case, not proof that the same deployment still operates in 2026. Nor should a study of another vendor's algorithm be passed off as a study of Palantir. The defensible concern is that records of police contact and social association can become reasons for additional attention even when they do not establish guilt. Human review is valuable, but it is not enough if the reviewer cannot explain the underlying inference to a person affected by it.

On February 16, 2023, the German Federal Constitutional Court ruled that particular automated-data-analysis provisions in Hesse and Hamburg were unconstitutional because their interference thresholds were insufficient. Hesse was using hessenDATA. Hamburg's provision had not yet been used. The court explained that joining previously separate data and generating new information can itself interfere with informational self-determination. Hamburg's challenged provision was void. Hesse's could operate temporarily with restrictions while lawmakers revised it. S13

The judgment did not ban Palantir worldwide, hold every analytical technique unconstitutional or decide that crime prevention is illegitimate. Its important principle is narrower and more powerful: possessing individual records does not automatically justify unlimited recombination and inference. Authorization must match the intrusion.

Palantir's 2025 response to Amnesty states that it does not build or facilitate predictive-policing workflows, including in Israel, and its appended response states a broader historical denial. That position must be reported alongside historical journalism describing New Orleans in those terms. The discrepancy deserves a workflow-specific explanation — what the company counts as prediction versus analyst-led network analysis — not an unsupported assertion about intent. S15

5. Defense, Ukraine, Israel and Gaza

Palantir's annual report describes Gotham as integrating data across sensors and domains, helping operators plan and execute missions, and accelerating operational decision-making. The official Maven awards establish substantial US military procurement. These records substantiate a defense role. A product capability description does not independently establish what happened in a particular strike. S1 S6 S7

For Ukraine, Reuters reported in February 2023 that Karp said Palantir was responsible for most targeting, with a spokesperson specifying tanks and artillery. Reuters also quoted Ukrainian vice-prime-minister Mykhailo Fedorov describing situational-awareness systems informing military decisions. The phrase “most targeting” remains Karp's claim, not an independently measured share reproduced here. The Reuters account was opened through Euronews syndication, which is not a second investigation. S18

Ukraine's Ministry of Economy announced a separate March 3, 2024 partnership for humanitarian demining: combining data to prioritize land release, coordinate resources and recommend methods. That is evidence of a signed program and intended capabilities, not by itself a count of mines cleared or lives saved. A serious investigation should include this potentially beneficial application rather than imply every use is coercive. S19

The Israel partnership is not merely alleged. Palantir's own public statement says it agreed to supply technology to the Israeli Ministry of Defense to help the country's war effort. The January 2024 agreement therefore warrants scrutiny regardless of whether every operational detail is public. S14

What the partnership does not establish is equally important. Globes reported in January 2024 that military-intelligence bodies had declined the company's services and described logistics and manpower roles. That was a contemporaneous account, not proof of the situation in every later month. In its 2025 response to Amnesty, Palantir acknowledges civil, defense and intelligence-related mandates in Israel but expressly denies involvement in Gospel and Lavender and denies providing the scaled targeting technology alleged in the inquiry. S16 S15

A 2025 report by UN Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese alleges a role for Palantir in Israeli military and surveillance infrastructure. The Business & Human Rights Resource Centre's opened summary records those allegations. The full OHCHR report was not successfully retrieved in the research session behind this file. The summary is evidence that the allegations were made, not independent proof of each underlying operational claim. Palantir's response disputes the report and allegations of contributing to war crimes and genocide. S17 S15

The evidentiary ladder must not be collapsed. An agreement proves a relationship. Specifications establish a proposed capability. Logs and testimony can establish use. Incident records can connect use to an outcome. Legal responsibility requires additional legal and factual analysis. The reviewed sources do not establish that Palantir developed Lavender or Gospel, caused a specific civilian death, or has been adjudicated liable for an international crime. Neither product marketing nor company denials settle every operational question.

The warranted demand is disclosure of contract scope, human-rights due diligence, civilian-harm safeguards, escalation and refusal procedures, and independent access to incident-level evidence. Political support for a government is not proof of an unlawful act, but invoking lawful use is not a substitute for demonstrable safeguards.

6. NHS: ownership is not the same as independence

On November 21, 2023, the UK government announced an FDP contract for a Palantir-led group including Accenture, PwC, NECS and Carnall Farrar. It described investment of up to £330 million over seven years, linking existing records and operational information to improve waiting lists, theatre use and discharge. That is a maximum framework including associated services, not an immediate payment of the full figure to Palantir alone. S20

The government's safeguards are substantive and should not be omitted. A parliamentary answer dated November 6, 2025 says NHS England controls the national instance, local organizations control their local instances, Palantir operates under NHS instruction, and it does not own or control NHS data. It describes separately procured privacy-enhancing technologies, restricted access and auditable logs. The 2023 announcement also says the supplier cannot use data for its own purposes. S21 S20

Contractual data ownership is not operational independence. If applications, staff training and workflow logic depend on a proprietary platform, exporting records is not necessarily equivalent to recreating the service elsewhere. That is a risk to test through migration exercises and costs, not a conclusion that all exit is impossible.

On July 22, 2026, the Office for Statistics Regulation explained that NHS England's before/after performance comparisons cannot establish cause and effect because other variables were not controlled. OSR welcomed stronger caveats, clearer communications, trust-level transparency and an independent Imperial College evaluation commissioned by NHS England. OSR did not find that FDP has zero benefit, or that all benefit claims were fabricated. S22

At the November 4, 2026 Health and Social Care Committee hearing, questions 235–246 examined supplier dependence, exit plans, open standards and contested benefits. These are MPs' questions and assertions, not all independently established findings. The minister said the contract review was underway and that detailed plans covered eventualities. At questions 243–245, NHS England CEO Sir Jim Mackey said he would ask Palantir to clear future benefit claims with NHS England, while acknowledging difficulty enforcing the provision. S23

The Register's November 6, 2026 reporting adds Palantir UK executive Tom Watson's response: individual hospitals report benefits, even though the company cannot prove every additional procedure occurred because of its software. It also reports that independent evaluation results are expected after the extension decision. The original seven-year maximum must not be confused with an unconditional seven-year guaranteed term. The current extension review concerns a term ending in March 2027. S24

The accountability test is straightforward. Before a major renewal, can the NHS publish controlled benefit estimates, total implementation and migration costs, independently tested privacy controls, and a credible alternative? A hospital's positive experience is relevant evidence. It is not a controlled estimate of the software's marginal effect.

7. Lobbying and the revolving door

Former congressman Mike Gallagher's move is directly documented by Palantir's own announcement. Breaking Defense reported that he left Congress in April 2024, started at Palantir in June and became head of its defense division. The company's statement presents his national-security expertise as an advantage. This establishes movement from public policy into a contractor's business, not an improper award or a violation of post-employment rules. S26 S29

The Tech Transparency Project's February 7, 2025 investigation reported nearly $5.8 million in 2024 lobbying and described hires from government and movement involving the Pentagon's Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office. TTP is an advocacy watchdog, not a court or procurement auditor. Its spending figure is attributed here. The underlying Lobbying Disclosure Act filings have not been individually reconciled in this file, and no current 2026 lobbying total is asserted. S25

The Army independently confirms that Palantir CTO Shyam Sankar was among the executives commissioned as reserve lieutenant colonels in Detachment 201 on June 13, 2025. The stated aim was to bring commercial expertise into targeted military technology projects. This dual role raises a conflict-management question even without proof of misconduct. S27

A June 2026 account in The Next Web reports the Army's position that financial disclosure, ethics training, legal review of assignments and mandatory recusal from matters affecting members' financial interests apply. Accordingly, it would be misleading to turn earlier headlines about no blanket recusal from all defense business into a claim that no ethics restrictions exist. This file has not inspected Sankar's assignments, financial disclosures or recusal records. S28

The defensible scrutiny concerns rule design and enforcement: who writes requirements, who advises on architecture, who reviews potential conflicts, and what records are available afterward? Expertise can benefit government. The risk is that access also shapes demand or favors an incumbent. A chronology of jobs alone does not prove that happened in a specific procurement.

8. Epstein: correct the record before publishing

Forbes reported on February 5, 2026 that Epstein committed $40 million in 2015 and 2016 to Valar Ventures, a firm co-founded by Thiel. It attributes the approximately $170 million valuation as of the preceding year to the New York Times. These are separate venture-fund interests and a reported valuation, not evidence of a $170 million cash payout or a current November 2026 valuation. Forbes also reports correspondence in which Thiel advised against a proposed Palantir investment. S30

What can be said: credible reporting documents a financial relationship between Epstein and a venture firm co-founded by Thiel, raising legitimate questions about investor screening after Epstein's 2008 conviction. What cannot be said from these sources: that the Valar commitments financed Palantir, bought Palantir shares, funded its founding in 2003, or prove Palantir's involvement in Epstein's crimes.

The underlying fund subscription records, complete estate valuation analysis and full relevant DOJ correspondence were not independently inspected here. Forbes' reporting and its explicit attribution to the Times are not two independent verifications of the same valuation. No broad claim that Epstein could never have had any indirect exposure is made. This file simply does not have evidence establishing Palantir financing.

9. The strongest company defenses — and their limits

Palantir's 10-K describes granular permissions, retention and deletion tools, data provenance, auditability and human judgment. It also states that some problems should not be automated and that the company turns down opportunities inconsistent with its principles. These are relevant company commitments and product descriptions — not an independently audited guarantee that every customer deployment satisfies them. S1

A technically secure system can still carry out an overly broad policy. Conversely, an intrusive government mission does not prove the vendor lacks technical safeguards. The investigation is strongest when it asks both whether controls work and whether the underlying use should be permitted at all.

Timeline of the documented expansion

1. 2003

   Company founded; intelligence-focused origins

   S1

2. 2005 onward

   CIA analyst collaboration described in historical reporting

   S3

3. 2012–2018

   New Orleans partnership and eventual public investigation

   S12

4. September 2020

   Public listing and disclosure concerns reported

   S4

5. August 2021

   ICE publishes updated ICM privacy assessment

   S9

6. February 2023

   Ukraine targeting claim; German constitutional judgment

   S18 / S13

7. November 2023

   NHS announces FDP contract

   S20

8. January–March 2024

   Israel partnership; Ukraine demining agreement

   S14 / S19

9. May–August 2024

   Maven award; Gallagher appointment announced

   S6 / S26

10. April–July 2025

    ImmigrationOS expansion; Detachment 201; Army enterprise agreement

    S8 / S27 / S5

11. January–February 2026

    ELITE reporting; DHS purchasing agreement; Forbes on Epstein investments

    S10 / S11 / S30

12. July 2026

    UK statistics regulator requires clearer benefit caveats

    S22

13. November 4–6, 2026

    NHS benefit claims and dependence scrutinized in Parliament and reporting

    S23 / S24

Public-interest questions and records to obtain

Proposed reporting and public-records requests only. None has been sent. Checked items stay on this device. 0 of 10 marked.

1. 1.ICE and DHS: publish the current ImmigrationOS and ELITE data-source inventory, data-sharing agreements, purpose limitations and privacy impact assessments. Identify which HHS datasets are used, by whom and under what authority.
2. 2.ICE: release acceptance tests against the 2025 prototype requirements, current address-matching error rates, false-match review procedures and redress mechanisms. Distinguish analytical leads from evidence authorizing enforcement.
3. 3.Contracting agencies: produce order-level obligations and outlays under the Army enterprise vehicle, Maven and the DHS BPA, with predecessor-contract mappings, deobligations, competition records and independent cost comparisons.
4. 4.Defense customers and Palantir: describe which workflows support logistics, intelligence analysis or targeting; who approves recommendations; what legal review and civilian-harm processes apply; and what incident evidence can be independently reviewed.
5. 5.NHS England: publish the independent evaluation protocol, controls, full costs, trust-level uptake definitions, limitations and negative findings — not only favorable case studies. Do not treat before/after counts as causal estimates.
6. 6.NHS procurement leaders: publish an executable exit plan covering application logic, data lineage, staff training, migration time, licensing rights and tested portability. Does changing supplier require rebuilding essential workflows?
7. 7.Army ethics officials: release non-sensitive assignment scopes, conflict determinations and recusal arrangements for Detachment 201. Who can verify compliance, and who receives complaints from competitors?
8. 8.Palantir: explain how its prohibition on predictive policing distinguishes present policy from the historical New Orleans workflows documented by journalists. Publish independent evidence rather than rely solely on terminology.
9. 9.Palantir's board: identify the committee or officer responsible for evaluating high-risk customer uses, the thresholds for refusing or ending work, and how the founder voting structure affects accountability for those decisions.
10. 10.Valar and relevant estate representatives: clarify the dates, legal entities, committed versus paid-in capital and valuation methodology for Epstein-related fund interests. Do not presume any proceeds went to Palantir.

Scope, gaps and publication safeguards

This is a public-records research synthesis with sources opened for the investigation behind this file, not original interviews, a forensic software audit, discovery production or an exhaustive search of classified work. Research cutoff is November 6, 2026, Mountain Time. Sources retain their original publication dates. No claims about later events are made, and historical reporting is not silently presented as current deployment status.

The latest substantively reviewed oversight record is the November 4, 2026 UK parliamentary hearing, alongside November 6 reporting. The financial baseline is the 2025 Form 10-K filed in February 2026, not a claim that the file captures the latest quarterly results. No consolidated worldwide spending total, current market valuation, full-year 2026 revenue or current lobbying total has been verified. The live $PLTR panel is a separate market quote. It is not a finding of this investigation.

Access limitations recorded with the file: the New York Times Epstein article, the full OHCHR report and NPR's July 2026 Medicaid investigation did not yield readable full text in that session. They are not counted as opened supporting documents. The Epstein section relies on the opened Forbes article. The UN-allegation discussion relies on the opened BHRRC summary and Palantir's actual response. The original ICE limited-sources justification was located but its PDF could not be downloaded; its contents are attributed to WIRED rather than claimed as independently inspected. Those gaps are reasons to narrow claims, not to fill them with inference.

The Palantir response PDF and ICE's 2021 ICM privacy assessment were downloaded from public sites and read as extracted text. Search-result summaries were used for discovery, not as substitutes for opened supporting sources. The company, government agencies and advocacy groups are authoritative about their own statements but interested parties about the merits. A court ruling establishes its holding. A report of allegations does not establish legal liability.

Before publication of anything beyond this record: preserve the source versions, recheck all numbers and dates, request relevant responses, verify quotations against full context, and obtain legal review for allegations of criminality or complicity. Neither secrecy nor a refusal to comment proves misconduct. The underlying research session recorded that no material was posted, sent or shared externally, and no one was contacted for the report.

Source audit

S1–S30 were the opened sources in the underlying file. Syndications are not independent corroboration. Each source supports only the claims described above. Primary records are distinguished from journalism and advocacy.

• S1Palantir 2025 Form 10-K: business, revenue, government segmentSEC / company filing · primary · Filed February 17, 2026
• S22025 proxy: founder voting mechanism and officesSEC / company filing · primary · April 2025
• S3Michael Steinberger book excerpt: intelligence origins and In-Q-TelYahoo Finance · historical reporting / book excerpt · 2025 excerpt
• S4Lawmakers' disclosure concerns and In-Q-Tel holdingsTechCrunch · reporting on a congressional letter · September 30, 2020
• S5Enterprise agreement: explicit ceiling, not obligationsUS Army · primary · July 31, 2025
• S6Maven $480 million award noticeUS Department of Defense · primary · May 29, 2024
• S7Maven $795 million modification noticeUS Department of Defense · primary · May 2025
• S8ImmigrationOS requirements and $30 million updateWIRED · procurement-based reporting · April 18, 2025
• S9ICM Privacy Impact Assessment updateDHS / ICE · primary; downloaded and read · August 9, 2021
• S10ELITE maps, dossiers and address confidence scores404 Media · document and testimony-based reporting · January 15, 2026
• S11Department-wide DHS purchasing agreementWIRED · contracting and internal-email reporting · February 19, 2026
• S12New Orleans policing investigationThe Verge / Investigative Fund · records and interviews · February 27, 2018
• S13Judgment summary: automated data analysis in Hesse and HamburgGerman Federal Constitutional Court · primary · February 16, 2023
• S14Company statement announcing Israel defense agreementPalantir public LinkedIn post · primary · January 2024
• S15Response to Amnesty, including denial of Lavender and GospelPalantir · primary response PDF; downloaded and read · April 9, 2025
• S16Contemporary account of Israel defense rolesGlobes · reporting · January 29, 2024
• S17Summary of Special Rapporteur allegationsBusiness & Human Rights Resource Centre · allegation summary · 2025
• S18Ukraine targeting: Karp and spokesperson remarksReuters via Euronews · syndicated reporting · February 2, 2023
• S19Humanitarian demining agreementUkraine Ministry of Economy · primary · March 3, 2024
• S20FDP award, maximum value and safeguardsUK Parliament / ministerial statement · primary · November 21, 2023
• S21Data control, consultation and access safeguardsUK Parliament / written answer · primary · Answer described as November 6, 2025
• S22FDP metrics: causality caveats and transparencyOffice for Statistics Regulation · primary regulator finding · July 22, 2026
• S23FDP scrutiny, questions 235–246UK Health and Social Care Committee · primary transcript · November 4, 2026
• S24Benefit-claim approval and company responseThe Register · reporting · November 6, 2026
• S25Government hiring and lobbying investigationTech Transparency Project · advocacy watchdog · February 7, 2025
• S26Gallagher appointment: company announcementPalantir public LinkedIn post · primary · August 2024
• S27Army announces Detachment 201 executive reserveUS Army · primary · June 13, 2025
• S28Later Army position on ethics and mandatory recusalThe Next Web · secondary reporting · June 16, 2026
• S29Gallagher start date and defense roleBreaking Defense · reporting · August 22, 2024
• S30Epstein's Valar commitments; Thiel advised against a Palantir investmentForbes · reporting on investments and correspondence · February 5, 2026